INTRODUCTION
Hourly labour productivity, along with average hours worked, the employment rate and the working-age population as a share of the total population, is one of the accounting aggregates that determine per capita GDP. Yet according to many analyses, hourly labour productivity in several European countries is much the same as or even higher than in the United States, while per capita GDP is markedly lower (see Cette 2004 Cette , 2005 for a summary of this work). In quantitative terms, the difference can be put down to higher average hours worked and/ or a higher employment rate in the United States. This suggests that the United States is no longer setting the "technical efficiency frontier" 1 now defined by these European countries. In other words, some of the other industrialised countries have already closed the productivity gap. By "opting" for shorter working hours and/or lower employment rates, the European countries with high hourly productivity would also seem to be promoting more of a leisure society than the United States. The obvious question, addressed in what is becoming a wealth of literature, 2 is whether this greater emphasis on leisure in Europe is the expression of genuine social and collective preferences, or the outcome of the combined effects of regulatory provisions that curb labour-market participation by the working-age population and of tax provisions that act as financial disincentives to such participation.
The above analysis would be valid assuming constant returns to hours worked and the employment rate. Yet recent econometric work (for example by Belorgey, Lecat and Maury, 2004 ) on panels of countries has shown sharply diminishing returns to both parameters. This would mean that differences in hours worked and/or employment rates in many European countries push up hourly productivity there compared with the United States. The analysis proposed by Cette (2004 Cette ( , 2005 consisted in correcting "observed" hourly productivity by factoring in the differences in average hours worked and/or the employment rate (compared with the United States) stemming from these diminishing returns, in order to obtain "structural" hourly productivity. It then emerged that, with the exception of some highly specific small countries (e.g. Norway), structural productivity levels in every country were lower than in the United States, which would in fact still appear to be setting the "technical efficiency frontier".
Taking this analysis further, the present study focuses on refining the measurement of the effects of the employment-rate gap on productivity by breaking © OECD 2005 down the working-age population by sex and age into six categories (with three age groups: 15-24, 25-54 and 55-64) . This is because it is possible that diminishing returns to the employment rate vary across these categories, and it emerges that the gaps with the United States are not evenly spread but concern specific working-age population groups, i.e. the young, older workers or women. This empirical analysis is based on a panel of OECD countries from 1992 to 2002. The numerous problems of simultaneity between the variables are addressed by using instrumental variables.
The results should be viewed with the usual caution. They are associated with a large number of simplifying assumptions and should accordingly be viewed as realistic orders of magnitude rather than precise measurements. Of these assumptions, those of uniform returns to employment rates and hours worked are probably very robust. They suggest, for instance, that the returns to the employment rate of all six categories of the working-age population remain unchanged, whether the initial employment rate in that category is 20% or 70%.
We should point out that this study of the effect on productivity of the employment rate by sex and age is not directly comparable with the findings of studies on the productivity effects of the sex and age profile of the working population. Our study looks at the effects on productivity of the gender and age structure of the working-age population broken down into insiders and outsiders (i.e. those in or outside the labour market), rather than the effects on productivity of the age and gender structure of insiders alone. Among the recent empirical studies on the effects that the structure of the employed population has on productivity, Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) find that the productivity of women is less than that of men, and an age effect that is ambiguous (possibly quadratic); Aubert and Crépon (2003) find an age effect that is not really significant. 3 We should also point out that one explanation occasionally put forward for the effect of age on productivity is the diffusion and rapid renewal of new technologies, which may reinforce phenomena relating to the erosion of human capital with age (for this, see for instance Aubert, Caroli and Roger, 2004 ).
This study begins by recalling the insights gleaned from a range of comparative measurements of "observed" hourly productivity, before moving on to estimate the returns to hours worked and the employment rate, this second parameter being considered first at an aggregate level and then by category of the working-age population. The study then measures "structural" hourly productivity, adjusting for the effects of differences in hours worked and the employment rate on "observed" productivity, and ends with some concluding remarks.
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APPARENT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES
The international comparisons available on labour productivity are contrasting 4 but the evidence they provide appears to be robust to the inevitable statistical uncertainty (Table 1): • According to this, the countries with the highest hourly labour productivity levels are in Europe. In Belgium, France, Ireland and Norway, they appear to be particularly high. This suggests it is not the United States that is currently setting the "technical frontier" but rather some European countries. 
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• Given the comparatively low hourly productivity of some European countries like Spain and more particularly Portugal and Greece, hourly productivity, in the European Union of 15 member States, would appear to be markedly lower (by some 10 to 20 percentage points) than the United States average. The gap also appears to be large in the United Kingdom (some 15 to 20 points), Canada (some 15 points) and Japan (25 to 30 points).
At the same time, among the countries with hourly labour productivity levels similar to those of the United States (with a difference of less than 10 points), the hours worked and employment rates (except in Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark) are markedly lower than those observed in the United States (Table 2 ). The gap is particularly large for hours worked in the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Belgium and France; and for the employment rate in Italy, Spain and Belgium and, to a lesser extent, France, Germany and Ireland. We should point out that the lower number of hours worked may stem from shorter full-time working hours or a higher level of part-time work, or even from a combination of the two, as is the case in the Netherlands. The lower employment rate may stem (in quantitative terms) from a lower participation rate or a higher unemployment rate.
Differences in hours worked and employment rates across countries may affect relative productivity levels, as the returns to these two parameters are not constant:
• It is often assumed with regard to hours worked that the effects of fixed costs (which produce increasing returns to hours worked), stemming for instance from the inclusion in hours worked of periods of time that are hard to shorten and not directly productive, are outweighed by the effects of fatigue (which produce diminishing returns). Consequently, returns to hours worked are assumed to be diminishing in the aggregate. 5 The assumption that there are strong fatigue effects may seem surprising given that the working week is at a fairly historic low in many industrialised countries. It should be borne in mind that hours worked are given here as an annual average and that these fatigue effects also include leave and sick-leave effects.
• The assumption of constant returns to the employment rate could be accepted if we assume that employment-rate differentials are identical across all working-age categories. Yet a close look at the employment-rate gap between Western Europe and the United States shows that this assumption should be categorically rejected (see Table 3 ). Breaking the working-age population down by gender and into three age groups (young, adults and older), we see that the differences in the employment rates are negligible for adult men and women (except for adult women in Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland) and that they are concentrated in the younger age group (the employment-rate gap with the United States is at least 20 points in France, Italy, Greece and Belgium) and the older age group (the gap is at least 20 points in those same four countries, as well as in Germany, Spain and Austria). The productivity of younger and older people who are not in employment can be considered to be lower than that of adults in employment. In the case of younger people, the differential stems from the fact that the more productive are hired first; as for older people not in employment, it stems from a loss of human capital, since older people who are still in their jobs have probably maintained or even increased their human capital more than those who are no longer in employment. In European countries, the foreseeable increase in the average employment rate will concern mainly these two age groups (younger and older people not in employment), which © OECD 2005 means that returns to the employment rate will be diminishing. 6 At this point it is important to stress that the analysis of linkages between employment and productivity focuses, in this study, on the productivity of labour-market "outsiders" whereas previous work focused on "insiders". Use of the existing literature on this subject is accordingly limited (see above).
Thus, increasing hours worked and employment rates in continental European countries would lower the comparative level of hourly labour productivity there. In other words, the strong hourly productivity performance of many European countries compared with the United States cannot be attributed solely to good causes: their performance is boosted by the fact that average hours worked are much fewer than in the United States and that employment is heavily concentrated in the most productive segments of the population. The less productive 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT RATES AND HOURS WORKED: AN AGGREGATE APPROACH
The variables are defined in the box below and details of sources are given in the Annex. We shall be looking in turn at the estimated relationship, the results of estimates using the OLS method and those obtained using instrumental variables.
Estimated relationship
An analysis of the impact on labour productivity of changes in the employment rate and hours worked may initially be envisaged using econometric estimates of the following dynamic relationship (1) , based in part on estimates by Marquez (2002, 2004) or Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) , in which the explained variable (Δph) corresponds to the rate of change in hourly labour productivity (PH):
where:
• The estimates are conducted on relationship [1] in its dynamic or static form (by constraining a 1 = 0). The expected sign of a 1 is a priori uncertain, the sole constraint on this coefficient being |a 1 | < 1. If a 1 > 0, the long-term effect of a change in the other variables is greater (in absolute terms) than the shortterm effect. For example, an increase in the employment rate (ER) reduces hourly productivity, but less in the short term than in the long term as firms may temporarily offset the effect of hiring less productive people by increasing rates of work. Conversely, if a 1 < 0, the long-term effect of change in the other variables is smaller than the short-term effect. In the same example, this means that an employment-rate increase reduces hourly productivity more sharply in the short term than in the long term as the people concerned gradually close some of their productivity gap, the initial gap being to some extent caused by a loss of human capital, stemming from the fact that they were previously not in employment.
• The coefficients a 2 and a 3 reflect the short-term effects of absolute changes in the employment rate (ΔER) and the rate of change in hours worked (Δh) on hourly productivity. A priori we expect: -1 < a 2 , a 3 ≤ 0.
• The coefficient a 4 reflects the effects of the economic cycle on hourly productivity, the position in the cycle being quite simply measured by the capacity utilisation rate (CUR). A priori we expect to find: 0 < a 4 .
• There are numerous other variables X i that may affect labour productivity.
Those whose effects have been tested here are investment rates (INVR, with an expected coefficient that is positive), ICT production as a share of GDP (ITPR, positive), ICT spending as a share of GDP (ITSR, positive), the ICT investment rate (ITIR, positive), 7 R&D spending as a share of GDP (R&DSR, positive), internet users as a share of the population (IUR, positive), the change in self-employment as a share of total employment (ΔSER, uncertain) , the change in part-time employment as a share of total employment (ΔPTR, uncertain) 8 and the change in public employment as a share of total employment (ΔPER, uncertain). The choice of these variables was to some extent dictated by previous studies, such as those by Marquez (2002, 2004) and Belorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) which focus on the impact of ICT on productivity. Both studies show that the acceleration in productivity in the United States in the second half of the 1990s was in part due to the size of the ICT producing sector and to the widespread diffusion of ICTs there. As this is a first-difference study, many of the determinants of productivity that are very stable in every country over the period concerned (e.g. human capital) have not been used. For the same reason, the impact of missing level variables has not been captured by the fixed effects tested for, as they are not significant in any of the 14 countries that were eventually selected.
The specification represented by relationship [1] is obviously very simplistic. In particular, the dynamic effects are represented by the mere presence of an autoregressive term and are therefore assumed to be identical for all of the relevant explanatory variables. Furthermore, the effects of each explanatory variable on productivity are assumed to be the same, regardless of the variable's actual level, which is also a powerful simplifying assumption. The assumption regarding non-linear effects is quite plausible as an economic reality. So the results of the estimates set out below should be viewed with the utmost caution: while the direction of the effects addressed here can be viewed as robust, their magnitude is bound to be very imprecise.
The estimates are based on annual data for the period 1992-2002 across a panel of 25 OECD countries, as listed in the box below. We have opted for a short estimation period (11 years) but the information required for our final choice of estimates was not always available over a longer period.
© OECD 2005 Box 1. Variables used in the study
The definitions and sources of these variables are given in the annex.
• PH 
List of the 25 OECD countries serving as a basis for this empirical study:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States List of 21 countries:
The previous list of 25 countries, excluding Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Mexico.
List of 14 countries:
The previous list of 21 countries, excluding the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Portugal and the Slovak Republic.
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Estimation results using the OLS method
The estimates of dynamic relationship [1] (a 1 ≠ 0) or static relationship [1] (a 1 = 0) obtained using the ordinary least squares method (OLS) produce the following results (see Table 4 ):
• The estimated values of some coefficients are not stable to the list of countries. For instance, i) the coefficient for the rate of change in hours worked (Δh) is strongly impacted by the inclusion of Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Mexico on the list of countries (differences between columns [1] and [2] in Table 4A and B); ii) the coefficients for changes in the capacity utilisation rate (ΔCUR), ICT production as a share of GDP (ITPR) and the autoregressive term (Δph -1 ) are strongly impacted by the inclusion of the same four countries (differences between columns [1] and [2] in Tables 4A and B) these country groups are fairly specific: the first group of four countries comprises three small European countries for which some of the data used have occasionally had to be reconstituted, plus another country, Mexico, for which the available data are still somewhat imprecise; the second group comprises countries in Asia and Southern or Eastern Europe which are still trying to catch up with the more advanced industrialised countries. As these estimated coefficients are unstable to the list of countries, the emphasis is placed on analysing the results for the 14 most industrialised countries, none of which are shown by the estimates to have a marked impact on the results. Moreover, for this same group of 14 countries, the estimates also appear to be robust when one or two years of observation are withdrawn.
• The coefficients of the variables for investment rates (INVR), ICT spending as a share of GDP (ITSR), the internet user ratio (IUR) and R&D spending as © OECD 2005 a share of GDP (R&DSR) carry the opposite sign to the one expected and are usually not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the coefficients of the variables for changes in the rate of self-employment (ΔSER), part-time employment (ΔPTR) and public employment (ΔPER) are not significant in any of the estimates. Consequently, these variables will not feature on the list of explanatory variables. The study therefore focuses on the estimates whose results are set out in column [3] of Tables 4A and B. • The estimation results of the static and dynamic relationships are consistent with regard to long-term effects. According to the dynamic formulation (Table 4B , column [3] ), it emerges that i) a one-point change in the employment rate has an inverse effect on hourly productivity of 0.20% in the short term (the same year) and 0.22% in the long term; ii) a 1% change in hours worked has an inverse effect on hourly productivity of 0.57% in the short term and 0.64% in the long term; iii) a one-point change in the utilisation rate has a parallel effect on hourly productivity of 0.09% in the short term and 0.10% in the long term; iv) a one-point change in ICT production as a share of GDP has a parallel effect on growth in hourly productivity of 0.15% in the short term and 0.17% in the long term.
The results obtained can be compared with the only two previous studies proposing estimates of identical or similar relationships:
• Marquez (2002, 2004) , using OLS or GLS on the private sector alone over the period 1993-2000, have estimated a relationship very similar to static relationship (1) on a panel of 13 countries (plus Ireland in our own panel of 14 countries) over the 1990s. 9 They do not take into account the effect of change in hours worked, and the measurement of the position in the cycle is an OECD estimation of the GDP differential, where the coefficient is not significant. ICT production as a share of GDP and ICT spending as a share of GDP are, along with changes in the employment rate, explanatory variables whose coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. The effect of a change in the employment rate, measured by the employed share of the 15-and-over age group, is 3.5 to 4 times stronger than the one estimated here for the change in the employment rate measured by the employed share of the 15-64 age group. There are many possible reasons for the differential, including a difference in coverage (private economy or economy as a whole), a difference in the definition of the relevant variable (employment rate in the 15-and-over age group or the 15-64 age group), or a difference in the panel (presence or absence of Ireland, period covered).
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• Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) The explanatory variables for changes in productivity are variations in the employment rate, hours worked, the capacity utilisation rate and the level of ICT production and spending as a share of GDP. Changes in the utilisation rate always affect changes in productivity, with a coefficient very similar to the one estimated here (0.1% of productivity for a one-point variation in the utilisation rate). ICT production and spending as shares of GDP have a joint effect on changes in productivity, but the production effect alone is specifically significant, as in our measurement. Finally, a 1% increase in hours worked or in the employment rate reduces hourly productivity by some 0.65% and 0.3%, respectively, for the 25-country panel and by 0.8% and 0.4% for the 13-country panel. These results are similar to ours, given the differences in the samples.
Estimation results using the instrumental-variables method
The estimation results presented above may be subject to simultaneity bias. To correct for this, the study continues using instrumental variables. Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) used GMM, but their estimates were based on 25 countries, including those that have just been shown to have a strong impact on estimation outcomes. The focus of this study is confined to 14 countries, a sample too small to envisage using GMM.
Three tests are used to assess adjustment quality: the Startz test (1990a and 1990b) and the Sargan test (1958) , which tell us about the overall quality of the adjustment and the overall relevance of the instruments, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) to ensure that the instruments are exogenous.
As with estimates using the OLS method, the variable coefficients for investment rates (INVR), ICT spending rate (ITSR), R&D spending (R&DSR), changes in the rate of self-employment (ΔSER), part-time employment (ΔPTR) and public employment (ΔPER) always showed an implausible order of magnitude, and all of these variables were eventually removed from the list of explanatory variables. We also conducted a more in-depth analysis of the impact of ICT investment as a share of GDP (ITIR) and its findings are set out and discussed below. The instrumentation of explanatory variables is aimed at correcting for two types of specification bias in the estimates: bias stemming from certain errors of measurement that are inevitable with the variables used and bias caused by simultaneity between those same variables. Many ranges of instruments were tested for relevance. The most satisfactory (column [8] in Table 5 ), namely the one that produces plausible results and is validated by all three tests, is obtained for relationship (1) estimated as dynamic (a 1 ≠ 0), does not instrument the autoregressive term (Δph) -1 , change in hours worked (Δh) or change in the capacity utilisation rate (ΔCUR) and © OECD 2005 opts to use as instruments for the other variables the second difference of the explained variable [Δ2(Δph)], present (Δq) and lagged variations (Δq -1 ) in output, the lagged variation in the employment rate (ΔER -2 ) and the investment rate (INVR). This is because there is evidence that using variations in hours worked or the capacity utilisation rate, in a static (a 1 = 0) or dynamic (a 1 ≠ 0) form of relationship (1), always produces less satisfactory results (columns [1] to [7] of Table 5 ). Δph - The use of instrument Δ2(Δph) was questionable on the grounds of simultaneity. It was therefore replaced in supplementary estimates by the same variable lagged by one period. However, this change of instrument reduces the DurbinWu-Hausman statistic and produces long-term coefficients that are very similar to those given above. The results of these alternative estimates can be otained from the authors on request.
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The results thus obtained tell us that (column [8] of Table 5 ).
1. The use of instrumental variables substantially alters the impact of the autoregressive term. This is because, owing to the autoregressive nature of relationship (1), the OLS estimator is theoretically non-convergent (if the residuals do not all have the right homoscedasticity), unlike the instrumental variables estimator. Moreover, as the autoregressive term, by construction, has the most simultaneity with the other variables concerned, it is the most sensitive to the corrections for bias made by instrumental variables.
2. The long-term coefficients here would be smaller than the short-term ones, as the autoregressive term has a negative sign. Again, in the case of change in the employment rate or hours worked, this means that there is a learning effect. This is particularly satisfying with regard to the effects of changes in the employment rate. For instance, while people who are of working age but not in work are markedly less productive than those in work, the transition to employment enables them gradually to increase their human capital and approach (but not attain) the productivity level of people in employment.
3. It emerges that in the long term, i) a one-point variation in the employment rate changes hourly productivity by -0.46% (compared with a short-term effect of -0.64%); ii) a 1% variation in hours worked changes hourly productivity by -0.38% (-0.53%); iii) a one-point change in the utilisation rate raises hourly productivity by 0.08% (0.11%); iv) a one-point change in ICT production as a share of GDP raises the growth in hourly productivity by 0.54% (0.76%). These long-term effects differ fairly markedly from those estimated using the OLS method, as described above. However, they are very similar to those estimated by Belorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) using GMM on a panel of 25 countries, which indicate that in the long term: i) a one-point variation in the employment rate changes hourly productivity by -0.50% and ii) a 1% variation in hours worked changes hourly productivity by -0.36%.
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But there is quite a difference in the short-term effects of both these variables and in short and long-term effects of changes in the utilisation rate or ICT production as a share of GDP, which are not used in the remainder of this study.
Some studies, such as that of Marquez (2002, 2004) , have managed to identify an impact on productivity from ICT production but also an (only just significant) impact from ICT spending. Yet the influence of ICT spending as a share of GDP is not significant in the estimates described above. An interesting way of refining the analysis is to test the hypothesis of an impact of ICT investment spending alone as a share of GDP (ITIR). The results of the estimates are given in Table 6 .
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The ICT investment rate variable (ITIR) is only available for 13 of the 14 countries on the above list of countries, as the information is not available for Norway. To obtain a basis for comparison, therefore, we decided to repeat the most relevant of the previous estimates (column [8] of Table 5 repeated in column [1] of Table 6 ) using the smaller panel (column [2] of Table 6 ), leaving the remaining list of instruments unchanged. The outcome shows that the results with this smaller list of 13 countries do not differ markedly from those obtained earlier with the 14-country list (comparison of columns [1] and [2] of Table 6 ). The replacement, in the list of variables, of the ICT production rate (ITPR) by the ICT investment variable (ITIR) then destabilises all of the estimation results (column [3] of Table 6 ). In particular, the long-term elasticity of hourly productivity to hours worked falls to below -1, which is not economically plausible. Furthermore, while the sign is indeed positive as expected, the ICT investment rate coefficient is not significant. If the variables for the ICT production rate (ITPR) and the ICT investment rate (ITIR) are both present simultaneously, the coefficients for all of the variables other than the ICT investment rate (ITIR) are very similar to those estimated without the ICT investment rate variable (comparison of columns [4] and [5] with column [2] of Table 6 ). Furthermore, these two regressions prompt acceptance of the significant impact of ICT production and rejection of that of ICT investment. Thus, when ITIR is not instrumented (column [4] of Table 6 ), the sign for the coefficient of this variable appears to be implausible, which may stem from errors of measurement or simultaneity bias. Once this specification bias has been corrected by instrumenting the ICT investment rate (ITIR), the coefficient estimated for this variable is not significant (column [5] of Table 6 ).
These results confirm that the impact of ICT on productivity is clearer on our panel of countries with the presence of an explanatory variable giving the ICT production rate than with variables giving the ICT spending rate, even if that spending is for investment purposes.
APPROACH BASED ON A BREAKDOWN OF THE WORKING-AGE POPULATION
The results set out in Table 5 above confirm the idea that differences in employment rates and hours worked across the more advanced industrialised countries influence their comparative productivity. The effects of the employment rate on productivity have up to this point been addressed in the aggregate. It has been demonstrated above, however, that differences in employment rates concern different population groups, depending on the country. We should therefore look at the impact of an increase in the employment rate for each segment of the workingage population and each gender.
Methodology
Here we have opted to break the working-age population down into six separate categories by gender and age group (15-24, 25-54 and 55-64 years). The aim is to analyse the effect of a change in the aggregate employment rate caused by a change in the employment rate of each of these categories. Consequently the explanatory variables used here are the contributions of each category to the aggregate employment rate (rather than the employment rates of each category). These contributions, represented as ERC j , are equal to N j /POP where N j is the number of employees in category j and POP the working-age population. This breakdown facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, with the coefficient of ERC j corresponding to the effect on productivity of a one-point © OECD 2005 change in the aggregate employment rate stemming from a change in the employment rate of working-age category j. It also provides some interesting additivity, since the effect of an increase in the aggregate employment rate can be approximated by calculating the weighted sum of the coefficients for each contribution.
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This additivity makes it possible to check the model's specification by looking at whether this weighted sum is equal to the short-term coefficient attached to the aggregate employment rate, i.e. -0.635 (see Table 5 , column [8] ).
Estimating the model described in the first section but distinguishing the six contributions to changes in the aggregate employment rate produces implausible results, as some coefficients do not have the expected sign or are of an implausible order of magnitude. It therefore proved necessary to constrain the coefficients of the other variables in the estimate of relationship (1) to their previously estimated values (Table 5, column [8] ). Estimates were thus carried out on each category of the working-age population based on the relationship:
ERC j is the contribution of category j to the employment rate and ERC j is the sum of the contributions to the employment rate of all the other categories combined. Coefficients â i are the estimated values of the coefficients corresponding to relationship (1), set out in Table 5 , column [8] .
Relationship (2) was estimated using the instrumental-variables method, so as to correct for simultaneity effects. Three considerations guided the search for the right specification:
1. Regarding the estimate for each category j, the recalculated aggregate coefficient had to be consistent with the one estimated directly at the aggregate level in the previous section (-0.635).
2. Regarding the six estimates combined, the recalculated aggregate coefficient had to be consistent with the one estimated directly at the aggregate level in the previous section (-0.635).
3. The range of instruments used for each of the six estimates had to be relatively stable. We therefore began by using the same instruments as for the aggregate estimate. Subsequently, the only variables added to the initial range were those relating to employment.
The methodology used here is a simple quantitative breakdown of the shortterm effect on productivity of changes in the aggregate employment rate estimated above (-0.635) . This is why it is crucial that the estimates relating to each of the six relevant categories be consistent with the aggregate estimate. [2] © OECD 2005
Employment-rate effects by age group and gender
Estimating relationship (2) on the basis of the three considerations above produces the results set out in Table 7. For the estimate regarding women aged 55 to 64, a dummy variable had to be added for Spain. There, that particular category of the working-age population is characterised by an atypically low employment rate (20.1% in 2000) compared with other countries (37.1% across the OECD area).
Each of these six estimates produces a recalculated aggregate employmentrate effect that is very similar to the one estimated previously from relationship (1) . Furthermore, the Nelson and Startz and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that for each estimate, the instruments used appear to be exogenous and to correct the simultaneity bias appropriately.
Comparative effects on productivity of employment-rate changes in each category
The short-term effects on labour productivity of a one-point variation in the aggregate employment rate caused by a change in theemployment rate in one of (2) set out in Table 7 . From these coefficients we can calculate, as described above, the same short-term effects on aggregates by gender or age or on all those of working age. Finally, we can associate with each of these short-term effects a long-term effect based on an estimate of the autoregressive term in dynamic relationship (1) . 14 All of these effects are set out in Table 8 . The method used to calculate the aggregate effect on several categories is not strictly speaking an arithmetical average (see note 13). So the value of the semi-elasticity recalculated for aggregate categories is not necessarily included in the interval defined by the semi-elasticities of the various categories concerned.
For the reasons described above, the effects set out in Table 8 for one category of the working-age population cannot be directly interpreted as information on the productivity of that particular category, in respect of either those in the category who are employed or all those of working age. Regarding such effects, the differences between categories should not be directly interpreted as productivity gaps between the two categories but rather as productivity gaps between people in each category who are currently not employed but would be the first to move into employment. Such comparisons require caution since the effects are an average for all 14 countries and may mask differences between countries that stem from salient features such as the employment rates in each category. This is because the actual impact of a change in a particular category's contribution to the aggregate employment rate is likely to vary from one country to another, depending on the initial level of the employment rate in that category. Notes: For the reason given in the study, the value of the semi-elasticity recalculated for aggregate categories is not necessarily included in the interval defined by the semi-elasticities of the various categories concerned. Interpretation: A one-point increase in the aggregate employment rate induced by an increase in the employment rate of women aged 15 to 24 would bring down hourly labour productivity by 0.898% in the short term (the same year) and 0.645% in the long term.
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The productivity effects of a variation in the aggregate employment rate stemming from a variation in the employment rate of working-age people in the younger age group (15 to 24) and older age group (55 to 64) are markedly greater than for those in the middle age group (25 to 54). Yet we saw above that employment-rate differentials between the larger industrialised countries and in particular vis-à-vis the United States concern mainly younger and older members of the working-age population. This means that differences in employment rates can heavily impact on relative levels of hourly productivity. In particular, they can contribute to a marked increase in the hourly productivity of many countries vis-à-vis the United States. Furthermore, owing to structure effects (as the semi-elasticities are similar for men and women in each of the three age groups), the productivity effects of a variation in the aggregate employment rate stemming from a change in the employment rate of women are slightly greater than for men.
The effects of an increase in the employment rate in the 15-24 age group may look substantial: a one-point rise in the employment rate stemming from an increase in the employment rate of younger people would bring about a long-term decrease of 0.64% in hourly labour productivity. This calls for two comments: i) first, some of the young people concerned may be underachievers and their productivity may actually be markedly lower than average for those in employment; ii) any person in this category eventually moves into the higher age group (25 to 54) where productivity is similar or identical to that of the average person in employment. This individual dynamic dimension certainly puts into perspective the scope of any estimated effects on productivity that may be produced by an increase in the employment rate of the younger age group. The effects of an increase in the employment rate in the 55-64 age group may also look substantial. Again, this calls for three comments, which may help to explain the importance of this effect: i) some members of this age group have worked little if at all and so have little work experience; ii) others have failed to maintain their human capital and may have accordingly lost their jobs; iii) some of those aged 55 to 64 who enter employment (or re-enter after a period of non-employment) are not going to make a genuine effort to develop their human capital, given their fast-approaching retirement.
FROM OBSERVED PRODUCTIVITY TO STRUCTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
To calculate "structural" productivity compared with the United States, the long-term coefficients of hours worked and the employment rate were applied to the differences (vis-à-vis the United States) "observed" for both of these variables. In this approach, it is assumed that the effects estimated above of annual changes in each variable in each country can be transposed so as to gauge the effects of what may be large differences for the same variables across countries, which is © OECD 2005 again a highly simplifying assumption. The following calculations should therefore be viewed with the utmost caution.
An initial measurement of the effects of employment-rate differences can be obtained from estimates at the aggregate level (see Table 5 , column 8). A second measurement is based on estimates for each of the six categories of the workingage population (Table 7) . This disaggregate measurement also produces a structure effect for the working-age population.
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The results obtained using these different approaches are set out in Table 9 .
The effects obtained here using the aggregate approach are often smaller than those measured by Cette (2004 Cette ( , 2005 , owing to the semi-elasticity of productivity to the lowest employment rate in absolute terms. Again, the elasticity selected here appears more robust to the list of countries in the sample.
In four countries the employment-rate difference with the United States is found to lower hourly productivity, namely the Netherlands using the aggregate . Details of how these effects were calculated are given in the study. Interpretation: If France had the same employment rates as the United States, hourly labour productivity would be 4.5% lower using the aggregate approach and 5.3% lower using the approach based on working-age categories, as the effect is broken down into a negative effect of 5.9% for employment-rate effects alone and a positive effect of 0.5% for the structure effect.
© OECD 2005 approach and Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom using both approaches. In these four countries, the aggregate employment rate is higher than in the United States. Everywhere else, employment-rate gaps increase hourly productivity, sometimes substantially (over 5%) as in France, Italy and Spain. The approach based on disaggregation into working-age categories produces effects that are in some cases markedly different to those produced using the aggregate approach. This is particularly the case in Ireland and Japan (where the difference between the two approaches exceeds one point). For countries where the differences in the employment rate with the United States are particularly concentrated on the young and old, which display the lowest estimated semi-elasticities of productivity to the employment rate, the disaggregate approach gives rise to a greater productivity effect for this difference than the aggregate approach. Examples include France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
With this full set of estimation results, we can roughly measure the "structural" level of hourly productivity for each country compared with the United States. This is the relative level of "structural" hourly productivity that would be observed, given the assumptions made, if each country's hours worked and employment rates (for each working-age category) were the same as in the United States. This calculation, the results of which are set out in Table 10 , takes into account the diminishing return effects of hours worked and employment rates, based on the elasticities mentioned above, selecting the measurements obtained with the disaggregate approach for the employment-rate effect. The insight gained from this is similar to that derived from the previous, less detailed study by Cette (2004 Cette ( , 2005 .
In every country, the "structural" level of hourly productivity (compared with the United States) is lower than the "observed" level. The fewer hours worked (except in Australia, Japan and Spain) and the lower employment rates (except in Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) produce a significant rise (of over one point) in the comparative level of "observed" hourly productivity. The gap between "observed" and "structural" productivity is often wide: in the case of France, for instance, it is around 15 points (9.5 points and 5.5 points). It exceeds 10 points in the three largest continental European countries only (France, Germany and Italy) as well as in the Netherlands and Norway, and 5 points in Spain. Conversely, it is insignificant (less than 1 point) in only two countries, Australia and Japan, where hours worked and employment rates are both very similar to the levels observed in the United States.
Of the four countries where "observed" levels of hourly productivity are higher than in the United States (France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway), only two also have higher "structural" levels of hourly productivity than the United States. They are Ireland and Norway, both small countries where the observed productivity levels are "artificially" raised by salient features, namely the impact © OECD 2005 of profit transfers stemming from very atypical corporate tax incentives in the case of Ireland, 16 and a highly capital-intensive structure with the focus on three industries -oil, timber and fisheries -in the case of Norway. Apart from those two special cases, the fact that "structural" hourly productivity levels are higher in the United States than elsewhere shows that the US is indeed setting the "technical frontier" in terms of productive efficiency and that other countries are lagging behind to varying degrees.
Leaving aside the two small countries (Ireland and Norway) with their special profiles as described above, there is evidence that the gaps between "structural" and "observed" relative hourly productivity levels are all the greater (in absolute terms) when the "observed" relative hourly productivity levels are also high (see figure) . It is even clearer if we exclude Spain, which is still catching up in terms of Interpretation: If France had the same number of hours worked as the United States, its hourly productivity would be 9.6% lower. If it had the same employment rates, its hourly productivity would be 5.4% lower. According to the OECD, "observed" hourly productivity is 113% of that of the United States. Corrected for differences in hours worked and employment rates, the "structural" hourly productivity consistent with this "observed" level would in France be 98% of that of the United States. productivity. This confirms that the high levels of "observed" hourly productivity in some European countries are largely attributable to their fairly low hours worked and/or employment rates, compared with the United States, and the diminishing returns to both parameters.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study confirms the diminishing returns to hours worked and the employment rate. With regard to the employment rate, this diminishing-returns effect is particularly marked in the younger age group (15 to 24) and the older age group (55 to 64) within the working-age population. On that basis, the study shows that the productivity performance of some European countries compared with the United States is largely attributable to the lower levels of hours worked and employment, both of which display sharply diminishing returns. These, in turn, are attributable to the effects of fatigue in the case of hours worked, and to the concentration of employment among adults (aged 25-54) in the case of the employment rate.
Leaving aside some smaller countries whose apparent productivity performance is largely attributable to salient features (Ireland and Norway), the United "Observed" relative hourly productivity level (%) and gap between "structural" and "observed" relative hourly productivity level (in points) Relative levels are defined vis-à-vis the United States
Source: "Observed" relative hourly productivity: OECD (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/40/29867116.xls) and Pilat (2004) ; gap between "structural" and "observed" relative hourly productivity: authors' calculations, see text.
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States is the country with the highest "structural" level of hourly productivity and is therefore setting the "technical efficiency frontier" for industrialised countries. The US lead in terms of ICT dissemination and production goes some way towards explaining its higher "structural" level of hourly productivity, a result that is consistent with previous studies (including Marquez 2002, 2004 ).
This analysis suggests that the difference in per capita GDP between European countries and the United States is attributable not only to these lower levels of hours worked and employment but also to lower "structural" productivity. In other words, the lower level of per capita GDP can certainly not be interpreted solely as the expression of a social or "lifestyle" choice combining superior productivity with a stronger preference for more leisure time. It also stems from a productivity gap with the United States. This calls for two economic policy recommendations:
• The first policy recommendation is to look into ways of enabling all of the industrialised countries to close their productivity gap with the United States. This gap, widely analysed by the OECD (2003a OECD ( , 2003b , is due to many possible causes, including lower average educational attainment in the working-age population, less ICT production and diffusion, regulatory rigidities on goods and labour markets -rigidities that lessen competitive pressure, eventually constitute rent and hamper certain flexibilities in the mobilisation of factors of production, lowering overall factor productivity. These numerous potential causes are interdependent. For instance, because rigidities on goods-and labour-markets may affect prices and hamper flexibilities, they may be one of the reasons for the delay in ICT diffusion. Furthermore, ICT use requires more highly skilled labour than other techniques, and a less skilled labour force may also mean less ICT diffusion.
• The second policy recommendation is to look into the real nature of the social choice discussed here, which may to some extent be prompted by various tax measures (see Cette and Strauss-Kahn, 2003) . With regard to the employment-rate and working-hour differential between many European countries and the United States, for instance, Prescott (2003) holds institutions largely responsible while Blanchard (2004) attributes even greater responsibility, especially regarding working hour differentials, to the expression of preferences, in other words social choices. Prescott's analysis (2003) assumes strong labour-supply elasticities to income from work, elasticities which are currently the focus of major debate in the literature (see for instance Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2005) . The work by Prescott (2003) and Blanchard (2004) suggests that regulatory arrangements and more broadly institutions should avoid incentives for lesser use of available labour resources and shift towards greater neutrality. This option, which applies more specifically to the younger, older and female members of the working-age population, with
These findings should of course be viewed with the usual caution, given the weakness of both the data used and the econometric investigations. They should be backed up with more robust analysis, taking into account for instance differences in employment rates in the working-age population depending on educational achievement. The insight they provide, however, constitutes a valuable springboard for reflection.
4. These three measurements are all initially based on national accounting data drawing on conventional options which may differ across countries. The differences may relate, for instance, to the treatment of the production of financial services, military spending or software spending. Furthermore, the differences observed in these measurements within a single country may have many different causes, including the source of employment data selected (Labour Force Survey or National Accounts), more or less recent revisions of GDP measurements or the conventions used to work out purchasing power parities (see Pilat, 2004; Cette, 2004 Cette, , 2005 also gives an overview of various sources of statistical uncertainty).
5. Based on a study conducted by INSEE on microeconomic data, Malinvaud (1973) states that since there are no better indicators than those of the type mentioned above, a coefficient of ½ should be applied to measure the impact that a reduction in hours worked has on hourly productivity. In view of the lesser effects of fatigue due to the decrease in average hours worked over recent decades, more recent research now applies a coefficient of 1/3 or 1/4 (see Cette and Gubian, 1997) .
6. This is also the analysis given by Giuliani (2003) . While not set out in detail, Wasmer (1999) supposes that the labour force composition affects productivity.
7. As this variable is available on a smaller sample than for the other variables, its introduction as an explanatory variable has been treated separately.
8. The effect on hourly productivity of a variation in the ratio of part-time jobs to total employment (ΔPTR) is in theory uncertain, owing to the presence of the variable for the rate of change in average hours worked (Δh) on the list of explanatory variables. The variable ΔPTR, for instance, is aimed at distinguishing between the special effect on productivity of a change in the share of part-time work and that of a change in full-time working hours.
9. The results referred to here are from Tables 2, 5 and 6 of Marquez (2002, 2004) .
10. However, we have checked that this difference in the sample (presence or not of Ireland and period of estimation) has, in itself, little impact on the estimation results. with Recalculated in this way, coefficient ã 2,i,t takes on a specific value for each country i and each year t. The recalculated effect ã 2 of an increase in the aggregate employment rate is therefore obtained using the mean M(i,t) of ã 2,i,t for all countries i and the whole of period t. The same method is used to calculate an aggregate effect on a group of categories (e.g. women, or young people).
14. The long-term effect is the short-term effect divided by 1.393, the estimated value â 1 of the coefficient of the autoregressive term Δph -1 of relationship (1) being equal to -0.393 (see Table 5 , column [8]). 15. Thus the effects (ERPE) on hourly productivity of differences in the employment rate, of each working-age category j, of country i compared with the United States are calculated as follows:
Here, the term corresponds to the effect of differences in the employment rate vis-à-vis the United States, while the term corresponds to the effect of differences in the structure of the working-age population. The effects of these differences in structure are always small in scale, which is why this second term is not broken down into its six component parts here.
16. Greenan and L'Horty (2004) , for instance, show that GDP is some 20% higher than GNP in Ireland, partly due to tax incentives resulting in the location of the profits of multinational companies in this country. 
